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FREE SPEECH FOR JUDGES AND DUE
PROCESS FOR LITIGANTS: THE
ELIMINATION OF FIRST AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT MUTUAL
EXCLUSIVITY IN SIEFERT V. ALEXANDER
MARGARET MARES*
I.

INTRODUCTION

When judges are speaking as judges, and trading on the prestige of
their office to advance other political ends, a state has an obligation
to regulate their behavior.1

To Judge John Siefert of the Wisconsin Circuit Court, his role
is that of an elected official. He believes that he is ultimately
accountable to the voters, rather than to the state of Wisconsin, as
his employer.2 Previously an active member of the Democratic
Party, Judge Siefert had to abandon his political affiliation when
he was elected to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court in 19993
* JD, The John Marshall Law School, May 2013. Maggie would like to thank
the editors of the Law Review for all of their hard work in preparing this
comment for publication, especially Paul and Brian. She would also like to
thank her friends and family for their continued love and support, particularly
her mother for always believing in her.
1. Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d. 974, 984 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010)). In Citizens
United, the Supreme Court notes that while political speech restrictions are
subject to strict scrutiny, “a narrow class of speech restrictions” are
constitutionally permissible if “based on an interest in allowing governmental
entities to perform their functions.”
2. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984. This is not an uncommon view. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are
Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 736 (2002) (stating that “[t]he vast
majority of states have judicial elections because of a belief that judges as
government officials should be accountable to their constituents” and that
“[b]y making this choice, the states . . . are turning judges into politicians”); see
also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002) (noting that
“elected judges . . . always face the pressure of an electorate who might
disagree with their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.”); David E.
Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 272 (2008)
(arguing that Americans are conflicted about the role of judges who are
protectors of constitutional rights and deep-seated values against majority
encroachments, yet who are still deferential to the political branches).
3. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977; see also Judge-Elect John Siefert, Milwaukee
County Circuit Court, New Branch 47, THIRD BRANCH 19 (Spring 1999),
333
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because Wisconsin’s Code of Judicial Conduct (“Code”) has
prohibited elected judges in the state from joining a political party
since its adoption in 1968.4
Wishing to communicate his political views with the voting
public, but not wanting to violate the Code and face disciplinary
action, Judge Siefert filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 in March
2008, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
members of the Wisconsin Judicial Commission, the body that
enforces the Code.6
This Comment begins in Part II by explaining the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Siefert v. Alexander, which struck down the
Code’s prohibition on judicial party affiliation, yet upheld its bans
on political endorsements and campaign fundraising.7 Part III
examines the importance of judicial independence with respect to
separation of powers and, in turn, due process concerns.8 It then
http://www .wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/spring99.pdf (reporting Judge
Siefert’s election to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court in 1999).
4. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978; see also Charles D. Clausen, The Long and
Winding Road: Political and Campaign Ethics Rules for Wisconsin Judges, 83
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1999) (discussing the adoption of the 1968 Wisconsin
Code of Judicial Conduct by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in response to a
request from the State Bar Association’s Board of Governors).
5. This section of the U.S. Code provides a civil action for the deprivation,
under color of law, of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or other laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
6. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977. The specific portions of the Code that Siefert
was worried about violating are found at WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)1., (b)4.,
and 60.06(4). See also WIS. SUP. CT. ORDER 00-07, 2004 WI 134 (Oct. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.org/cases/files/2011/04/Exhibit-toComplaint1.pdf (explaining the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s amendment to the
Code to extend a number of rules to cover judicial candidates in addition to
sitting judges, including the prohibitions on party membership, partisan
endorsements, and personal solicitation of campaign contributions).
7. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 983-90; see also Harvard Law Review Association,
Constitutional
Law—First
Amendment—Seventh
Circuit
Upholds
Endorsement and Personal Solicitation Clauses of Wisconsin Code of Judicial
Conduct.—Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010), 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1090, 1090 (2011) (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold
restrictions on the ability of judicial candidates to make political
endorsements and personally solicit campaign contributions).
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Siefert also created a circuit split. Compare
Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977 (upholding endorsement and personal solicitation
restrictions), and Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2010)
(upholding the same), with Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 203-04 (6th Cir.
2010) (striking down endorsement and personal solicitation restrictions)), and
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002) (striking down
personal solicitation restriction).
8. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933) (quoting
Chief Justice John Marshall in the course of the debates of the Virginia State
Convention of 1829-1830: “I have always thought, from my earliest youth till
now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an
ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent
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explains the Supreme Court’s narrow decision in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, which explored the scope of First
Amendment limits on state regulation of judicial campaign
conduct.9 It will argue that courts relying on White to strike down
restrictions on judicial speech have misinterpreted White’s limited
result and that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Siefert was not
only consistent with White, but also reconciled White with other
strains of First Amendment law.10
Part IV proposes that the more deferential tests the Seventh
Circuit adopted in Siefert should be implemented by other circuits
to evaluate judicial speech restrictions.11 Such tests are
appropriate first because the government in each state is the
employer of its judiciary and second because the government has a
duty to protect its citizens’ due process rights.12

Judiciary”); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 281 (2d ed. 1829) (stating that “[i]n a very early
period of our history, it was said, in words as true to-day as they were then,
that if they [the people] value and wish to preserve their Constitution, they
ought never to surrender the independence of their judges”).
9. White, 536 U.S. at 765; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White: What Are the Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1327, 1328-30 (stating that “the Court’s reasoning in White . . . does
not preclude all efforts by states to strike a balance in judicial elections
between First Amendment interests and the countervailing constitutional
interests in due process, separation of powers, and the fair and impartial
administration of justice”).
10. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 980-81; see also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1332-33
(noting that some lower courts have read White to prohibit virtually all
judicial election regulations that concern First Amendment interests);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 755-56 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (invalidating state bans on partisan political activities and personal
solicitation of contributions by judicial candidates on First Amendment
grounds); Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 (holding that the Court’s decision in
White prohibits all restrictions upon personal solicitation by judicial
candidates); but see In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 349-51 (Me. 2003)
(upholding prohibition on contributing to or soliciting funds for political
organizations); and In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290-93 (N.Y. 2003)
(upholding prohibition on partisan political activities).
11. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984; see generally White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (stating that “whether the rationale of [Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)] . . .
could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting judges regardless of whether they are campaigning—in order to promote the efficient
administration of justice, is not an issue raised here”).
12. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (finding that “it cannot be gainsaid that the
State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation
of the speech of the citizenry in general”); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (providing that “the government as
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign”); Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges’ Political Activity After
White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651, 696 (2005) (stating that “it is desirable for
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II. BACKGROUND
In Wisconsin, the state judiciary is elected through a series of
nonpartisan elections that are distinct from the elections for
partisan political offices.13 These elections “are nonpartisan in the
sense that all candidates . . . appear on the ballot without party
identification.”14
Ballots in Wisconsin’s judicial elections have not reflected the
candidates’ party affiliation since 1913.15 However, judges were
not expressly forbidden from joining a political party in Wisconsin
until 1968, when the state adopted a comprehensive Code of
Judicial Conduct.16 In October 2004, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
added several rules to the Code to govern the conduct of judicial
candidates in addition to sitting judges.17 These new rules
included
prohibitions
on
party
membership,
partisan
endorsements,
and
personal
solicitation
of
campaign
contributions.18
In Siefert v. Alexander, the Seventh Circuit considered three
clauses of the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct.19 The first
clause provided that no judge, candidate for judicial office, or
judge-elect may be a member of any political party.20 The second
executive branch employees to be independent of politics” and that “[t]he
implications of that interest, therefore, are directly applicable to the
implications of the interest in judicial independence; in both cases, it is
appropriate to restrict partisan political activity”).
13. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978 (explaining that “Wisconsin conducts two sets
of elections; one set . . . is held in the spring for positions filled through
nonpartisan elections and the other is held in the fall for the partisan elected
positions”). “Nonpartisan officeholders include judges of the circuit courts,
court of appeals, and supreme court, as well as the state superintendent of
public instruction, county board members, county executives, and municipal
and school district officers.” Id. Voting for offices filled through partisan
elections, including sheriff and district attorney, includes a primary election to
choose a single candidate for each of the two major parties, followed by a
partisan general election. Id.
14. Id.; WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (providing that “there shall be no election
for a justice or judge at the partisan general election for state or county
officers”); WIS. STAT. § 5.58 (2010) (stating that “only [candidates’] names shall
appear on the official spring ballot”); WIS. STAT. § 5.60 (stating that “no party
designation may appear on the official ballot”).
15. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978; see generally JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW, THE
STORY OF A GREAT COURT (1912) (Kessinger Publishing Company 2009)
(chronicling the history of judicial elections in Wisconsin and compiling a
comprehensive history of the legal system in Wisconsin).
16. Id.; see Clausen, supra note 4, at 2-3 (stating that, until 1968,
Wisconsin judges had no compilation of ethics rules specifically governing
their behavior as judges).
17. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978; WIS. SUP. CT. ORDER 00-07 2004 WI 134 (Oct.
29, 2004).
18. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978.
19. Id. at 978; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)1., (b)4., 60.06(4).
20. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)1.; Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978.
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clause prohibited judges and judicial candidates from publicly
endorsing or speaking on behalf of a political party’s candidates or
platforms.21 The third clause stated that no judge or judicial
candidate could personally solicit or accept campaign
contributions.22
Judge John Siefert, prior to being elected to the Wisconsin
Circuit Court in 1999,23 was a registered member of the
Democratic Party.24 He also took part in a number of partisan
endeavors.25 Most notably, he “served as a delegate to the
Democratic National Convention, twice ran as a Democrat for the
state legislature, twice ran as a Democrat for county treasurer,
holding that office from 1990 to 1993, and served as an alternate
elector for President Bill Clinton in 1992.”26
In 2008, Judge Siefert sought to rejoin the Democratic Party,
which he had left prior to his 1999 election to the bench.27 He also
wanted to publicly endorse other political candidates for office and
solicit contributions for his 2011 campaign “by making phone calls
to potential contributors, by signing his name to fundraising
letters, and by personally inviting potential donors to fundraising
events.”28 Because Judge Siefert wanted to engage in these
activities without incurring disciplinary action from the Wisconsin
Judicial Commission, he filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enjoin the Commission from enforcing the clauses of the Code that
prohibited such conduct.29 The District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White to declare all three clauses
of the Wisconsin Judicial Code unconstitutional.30
21. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)4.; Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978.
22. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(4); Siefert, 608 F.3d at 978.
23. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977; see generally THIRD BRANCH, supra note 3, at
19 (discussing Judge Siefert’s election to the Milwaukee Circuit Court in 1999
following his work as an assistant district attorney and as a member of the
Milwaukee Police Department).
24. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977; see generally Marie Rohde, Why Siefert Wants
to Be a Democrat, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 3, 2008),
http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/ 31892489.html (describing Judge Siefert’s
activism in the Democratic Party).
25. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Dee J. Hall, Is the Stage Set for Judicial Elections to
Become More Partisan in Wisconsin?, WIS. ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt_and_politics/article_ed085c5018e1-11df-a456-001cc4c002e0.html (referring to Judge Siefert’s statement that
judges had to “conceal [their] party identity”).
28. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977; see also Hall, supra note 27 (describing Judge
Siefert’s claim that he had a constitutional right to directly solicit money for
his campaign and to voice his support for then-presidential candidate, Barack
Obama).
29. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977.
30. Siefert v. Alexander, 597 F. Supp. 2d 860, 889-90 (W.D. Wis. 2009);
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In White, the Supreme Court invalidated a canon of
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited candidates
for judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal or
political issues.31 The Court stated that this “no-announce” rule
was subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny because it was
aimed directly at prohibiting speech on the basis of its content.32
As such, the Minnesota law needed to be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.33 Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, held that the “no-announce” rule did not satisfy this
test because it could not be narrowly tailored to an interest in
judicial impartiality toward either party to the proceeding.34
Furthermore, judicial impartiality toward a particular legal view
is not a compelling interest,35 and, by failing to regulate other
public commitments to legal positions that judges or judges-to-be

White, 536 U.S. at 775.
31. White, 536 U.S. at 788; MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i); Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 7, at 1090 (noting
that the Supreme Court used strict scrutiny to invalidate a Minnesota law
prohibiting state judicial candidates from publicly expressing their views on
legal and political issues in White); see also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1328
(stating that in White, the Supreme Court declined to treat judicial elections
as categorically outside the realm of uninhibited public debate); see generally
Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are
Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 629 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court
“fundamentally altered the landscape of state judicial elections” by making it
clear that “the States would need to ensure that their Codes of Judicial
Conduct allowed sufficient latitude to protect the First Amendment rights of
judicial candidates while still insulating the courts from undue or excessive
political influence”).
32. White, 536 U.S. at 774.
33. Id. at 775; see Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222 (1989) (stating that when a challenged law burdens rights of political
parties and their members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the
state shows that it advances a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest).
34. White, 536 U.S. at 776. The Court stated:
We think it plain that the announce clause is not narrowly tailored to
serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) in this sense.
Indeed, the clause is barely tailored to serve that interest at all,
inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or against particular parties,
but rather speech for or against particular issues.
Id. (emphasis in original).
35. White, 536 U.S. at 777-78. The Court found that
Impartiality in th[e] sense [of lack of preconception in favor of or against
a particular legal view] may well be an interest served by the announce
clause, but it is not a compelling state interest, as strict scrutiny
requires, . . . [because] it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does
not have preconceptions about the law . . . [and] even if it were possible
to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it
would hardly be desirable to do so.
Id. at 778. (emphasis in original).
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undertake, the “no-announce” rule was underinclusive.36
Thus, relying on White, the district court in Siefert subjected
all three provisions of the Code to strict scrutiny, thereby placing
the burden on the Wisconsin Judicial Commission to prove that
the restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.37 While acknowledging that judicial
impartiality is a compelling government interest, the court
nevertheless struck down all three provisions of the Code as not
being narrowly tailored to serve that interest.38 The court
determined that, because the restrictions did not prohibit judicial
involvement in other special interest groups, they were
underinclusive.39 Likewise, the court determined that the
Commission failed to show that the provisions were the least
restrictive means the state could use to eliminate partisan bias or
at least the appearance of partisan bias in judicial decisions.40
36. Id. at 778-79 (opining that “statements in election campaigns are such
an infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that
judges (or judges-to-be) undertake, that [serving the compelling interest in
open-mindedness, or at least in the appearance of open-mindedness] is
implausible.”).
37. Siefert, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 867; see, e.g., United States v. Playboy
Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (explaining the narrow tailoring
requirement of a strict scrutiny analysis); White, 416 F.3d at 478-79 (applying
strict scrutiny to restrictions on partisan activities of judges and judicial
candidates); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 2008 WL 4602786, at *5 (E.D. Ky. 2008)
(same).
38. Siefert, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 871-72 (recognizing that the interests
advanced by Wisconsin’s prohibition on announcing one’s political party can be
defined as (1) the absence of bias toward particular political parties that
appear before the court or toward litigants who are members of a political
party; (2) the absence of improper influence by a political party or a political
party’s ideology; and (3) the public’s perception that judges are not biased or
influenced by these improper influences); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (stating that “[a]lthough the phrase is hard to define,
the term ‘judicial independence’ embodies the concept that a judge decides
cases fairly, impartially, and according to the facts and law, not according to
whim, prejudice, or fear, the dictates of the legislature or executive, or the
latest opinion poll”).
39. Siefert, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (finding that many groups to which a
judge belongs may have an influence on his judicial philosophy and
interpretation of the laws); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 120 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (citing DANIEL R. PINELLO,
GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 203 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) to discuss
a study which found that Roman Catholic judges are eleven percent more
likely to rule against gay rights than Protestant judges and twenty-five
percent more likely to do so than Jewish judges).
40. Siefert, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (stating that to the extent the state
wishes to eliminate partisan bias or its appearance in judicial decisions, the
Code of Conduct includes rules tailored to address these concerns); see also
Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the
Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 570 (2004)
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The district court’s decision was affirmed in part and reversed
in part by the Seventh Circuit.41 In its opinion, the circuit court
first noted the tension between two competing strains of cases
found within First Amendment law.42 While cases such as White
demonstrate that judges are free to communicate their ideas to
voters,43 cases such as Pickering v. Board of Education allow the
government some leeway to proscribe certain categories of speech
among citizens in order to promote the efficient performance of
governmental functions.44 Instead of strict scrutiny, Pickering
employed a balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of
speech restrictions on public employees: the employee’s free speech
interest was weighed against the government’s interest in
providing efficient public services.45 Thus, the court’s decision in
Siefert attempted to “harmonize these two strains of First
Amendment law.”46
First, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Code’s ban on
party affiliation fell within the first strain of cases.47 Just as in
(arguing that “[t]he possibility of this less-speech-restrictive alternative
suggests that even the narrowest content-based prohibitions on truthful
judicial campaign speech may be unconstitutional”); Thomas R. Phillips &
Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants:
Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 707-11 (2007)
(highlighting the pros and cons of using recusal as a means to balance judicial
candidates’ free speech rights with litigants’ due process right to an impartial
forum).
41. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 977.
42. Id. at 981.
43. Id. at 980-81; see, e.g., Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir.
2007) (applying strict scrutiny to public censure order against state court
judge); Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319 (applying strict scrutiny to restriction on
candidate’s speech during election campaign for state supreme court); Kan.
Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1240 (D. Kan. 2006) (applying
strict scrutiny to judicial code provisions forbidding judicial candidates from
making pledges and promises, and forbidding them from committing to issues
likely to come before court); N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp.
2d. 1021, 1025 (D.N.D. 2005) (same).
44. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 980-81; see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899
(stating that “there are certain governmental functions that cannot operate
without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.”); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (restricting students’ use of vulgar
terms at school); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (restricting state
employees’ speech about working conditions); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 131-32 (1977) (restricting prisoners’ union-organizing
activity); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (restricting military
members’ dissent); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (restricting federal employees’ political activity);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 (1973) (restricting state employees’
political activity); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (restricting public school teachers’
speech).
45. Pickering, 319 U.S. at 568.
46. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 980-81.
47. Id. at 981.
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White, the party affiliation ban prohibited speech on the basis of
its content, a category of speech that is at the core of First
Amendment freedoms.48 Therefore, the court subjected the
provision to strict scrutiny and found that it failed because it was
underinclusive and the compelling interest it served could be
better addressed through recusal.49
Next, the court examined the Code’s endorsement clause.50 It
found that, unlike affiliation with a political party, the
endorsement of other candidates “is less a judge’s communication
about his qualifications and beliefs than an effort to affect a
separate political campaign, or even more problematically, assume
a role as a political powerbroker.”51 Such endorsements are more
partisan political activities than mere expressions of views, which
justify a more deferential approach to the government in their
prohibition.52 The court therefore balanced Judge Siefert’s interest
in endorsing other candidates against Wisconsin’s interest in
upholding the appearance of fairness and justice in its court
system and concluded that the state’s interest was weightier.53
According to the court, use of the Pickering balancing test was
appropriate for two reasons.54 The first concerned Judge Siefert’s

48. Id.; White, 536 U.S. at 774 (holding that “the announce clause both
prohibits speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech
that is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms – speech about the
qualifications of candidates for public office”) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
49. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 982-83. The court found that “[t]he state does not
have a compelling interest in preventing candidates from announcing their
views on legal or political issues, let alone prohibiting them from announcing
those views by proxy.” It also stated that “[w]ithout some specific,
individualized relationship, the affiliation between a judge who is a member of
a political party and other members of that political party is simply too diffuse
to make it reasonable to assume that the judge will exhibit bias in favor of his
fellow party members.”
50. Id. at 983-88.
51. Id. at 984. Judge Siefert noted in his brief that “[e]ndorsements
primarily benefit the endorsee, not the endorser” and endorsements may be
exchanged between political actors on a quid pro quo basis. Brief for Appellee
at 37 & n.11, Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 05-1631).
52. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984; see also Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556
(upholding the government’s authority to forbid federal employees from
organizing a political party or club; actively participating in fundraising
activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan
candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; initiating or
circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan
candidate for public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a
political party convention); see also Biller v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 863 F.2d
1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has drawn a careful
line between “partisan political activities” and “mere expressions of views”).
53. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987.
54. Id. at 984-85.
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status as an employee of the state of Wisconsin.55 Although elected
judges “receive job evaluations from the voting public,” they are
nevertheless employed by the state to carry out the day-to-day
task of operating the judicial system.56 Secondly, the Pickering
balancing test allowed Wisconsin to uphold its duty to promote the
efficiency of the public services it performs.57 Because inefficient
performance of Judge Siefert’s public function as a member of the
judiciary could violate due process, there was a sufficient basis for
granting deference to the state to restrict certain suspect
categories of judicial speech.58
The court also upheld the Code’s ban on the personal
solicitation of contributions by judges and judicial candidates.59 By
categorizing the solicitation clause as a campaign finance
regulation, and therefore subjecting it to closely drawn scrutiny,60
the court concluded that the solicitation ban was drawn closely
enough to Wisconsin’s interest in preserving impartiality and
preventing corruption to be considered constitutional under the
First Amendment.61
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Countervailing Constitutional Concern for Judicial
Independence
In order to understand the significance of the Seventh
Circuit’s departure from strict scrutiny in Siefert, it is first crucial
to comprehend the government’s countervailing interest in an
independent judiciary. Judicial impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality have long been recognized as state interests of the
highest order.62 Alexander Hamilton wrote that “liberty can have
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
everything to fear from its union with either of the other
departments.”63 By insulating judges from the influence of the
political branches,64 an independent judiciary preserves the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 984.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 990.
60. Id. at 988.
61. Id. at 990.
62. See White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “the
power and prerogative of a court” to elaborate principles of law in the course of
resolving disputes “rests upon the respect accorded to its judgments”); see also
Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1333-34 (finding that judicial independence serves
three compelling ends, “each itself of constitutional magnitude”).
63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
64. O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 532 (referring to Chief Justice John
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separation of powers,65 which in turn safeguards two important
due process concerns.66
First, judicial independence prevents unjustified or mistaken
deprivations of life, liberty, or property67 by ensuring that courts
decide cases based on the law and facts alone, and not judges’
political allegiances, financial obligations, or other improper
pressures.68 Second, judicial independence encourages those
individuals affected by the proceeding to participate in the
decision-making process.69 By ensuring that no person is deprived
of any interest without first having the opportunity to present his
case in a forum where the judge is not already inclined to find
against him,70 judicial impartiality preserves both the appearance
and reality of fairness, “generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done.”71 This is because
people’s faith in the judiciary ultimately depends on its reputation
for neutrality and detachment.72
Marshall’s aversion to a dependent judiciary); see also RAWLE, supra note 8
(stating that “if [the people] value and wish to preserve their Constitution,
they ought never to surrender the independence of their judges”).
65. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1334 (arguing that restrictions on state
judicial election procedures designed to ensure judicial independence serve a
compelling interest in preserving the separation of powers, one of the most
important values the United States has urged upon newly emerging
democracies); see also White, 536 U.S. at 803 (noting that the political
branches “represent ‘the People’; the judge represents the Law – which often
requires him to rule against the People”).
66. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (stating that under
the due process clause, a person is entitled to “an impartial and disinterested
tribunal in both civil and criminal cases” and that “this requirement of
neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards [the] central concerns of
procedural due process”).
67. Id.
68. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1334.
69. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242; see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259
(1978) (stating that due process is meant to protect persons “not from the
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or
property” and that it enables people “to contest the basis upon which a State
proposes to deprive them of protected interests”).
70. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242.
71. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (holding that
the mere presence of a particular judge as the presiding officer in a trial or
under a judicial system may violate due process); see, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822-23 (1986) (finding that a justice could not
participate in an appeal of a bad faith refusal to pay judgment against an
insurance company when that justice had a similar suit against a different
insurance company pending in a lower court); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57, 59 (1972) (reversing a conviction when a mayor whose village was financed
by fines collected in his court presided at trial); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403
U.S. 212, 215-16 (1971) (holding that a judge could not try a defendant for
contempt after losing a suit to the defendant); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
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B. The Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding in White
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme
Court did not consider in any depth the importance of judicial
impartiality when it invalidated the Minnesota Canon of Judicial
Conduct that prohibited judicial candidates from announcing their
political and legal views.73 The Court simply assumed that the
government has an interest in preserving judicial independence,
but because it determined that the content-based speech
restriction at issue was subject to strict scrutiny,74 it invalidated
the no-announce clause on narrow-tailoring grounds without
exploring the deeper constitutional values and policies served by
keeping judges separate from ordinary politics.75
This interest in judicial independence as a due process
requirement was not the only constitutional issue that the Court
declined to consider in its White analysis.76 For example, the Court
expressed no opinion on a clause in the Minnesota Judicial Code
prohibiting judicial candidates from making “pledges or promises
of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office.”77 Because the “pledges or
promises” ban on speech could never be constitutionally imposed
on candidates for political office,78 the Court did not rule out the
possibility that the First Amendment may allow for more speech
restrictions to be placed on judicial candidates than on other
political candidates,79 potentially triggering a different First
138-39 (1955) (holding that a judge who indicts a defendant cannot also
conduct the trial); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1954) (holding
that a judge who became personally entangled with counsel during a trial
could not preside over the contempt proceedings against that attorney); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (holding that a judge whose salary depends
on fines collected upon conviction cannot try a defendant).
73. See White, 536 U.S. at 775 (finding that “[t]he Court of Appeals
concluded that respondents had established two interests as sufficiently
compelling to justify the announce clause: preserving the impartiality of the
state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state
judiciary”).
74. Id. at 774.
75. Id. at 776 (“We think it plain that the announce clause is not narrowly
tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality)”).
76. See Phillips & Poll, supra note 40, at 698 (asserting that White was
“hardly a remarkable decision, as it affected only one obsolete provision that
seemed patently overbroad”).
77. White, 536 U.S. at 770 (stating that the “pledges or promises” clause
was “a prohibition that is not challenged here and on which we express no
view.”); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002).
78. See White, 536 U.S. at 812-14 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing
that the constitutionality of “pledge or promise” clauses was not challenged or
placed in doubt by White’s ruling, and insisting that such clauses serve vital
due process interests).
79. Id. at 783 (stating that “[w]e neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those
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Amendment analysis.80
By leaving these First Amendment issues untouched in
White, the Court actually reached a very narrow decision. It
simply held that judicial elections are not categorically outside the
domain of First Amendment protections.81
C. The Overzealous Interpretation of White by Lower Courts
Despite the narrow holding of White, some lower courts have
used the Court’s decision to prohibit virtually all judicial election
regulations that touch upon judges’ First Amendment interests.
For example, in Weaver v. Bonner, the Eleventh Circuit held that
White prohibits all restrictions on personal solicitation by judicial
candidates.82 At issue in Weaver was a canon forbidding judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions and
publicly stated support.83 The court found that the distinction
between judicial elections and other types of elections had been
greatly exaggerated, and that the distinction did not justify
greater restrictions on speech during judicial campaigns than
during other types of campaigns.84 Thus, because solicitation
restrictions would be unconstitutional in other public election
contexts, the court found that they were also unconstitutional in
the judicial election context.85
Likewise, in Carey v. Wolnitzek, the Sixth Circuit struck down
clauses in Kentucky’s Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited
judges and judicial candidates from soliciting campaign funds and

for legislative office”).
80. See also Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1331 (noting that because White only
concerned the rights of new candidates for judicial office, “it did not discuss or
reach the limitations that might be placed upon incumbent judges running for
retention or reelection while already sitting on the bench”).
81. See id. at 1329 (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in White does not
preclude all efforts by states to strike a balance in judicial elections between
First Amendment interests and other countervailing constitutional interests).
Specifically, “Justice Scalia noted that the Minnesota Judicial Code contained
a clause prohibiting judicial candidates from ‘making pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office,’ and expressly stated that that was a prohibition that is
not challenged here and on which we express no view.” Id. at 1331 (quoting
MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)). “The White
dissenters also emphasized that the constitutionality of ‘pledge or promise’
clauses was not challenged or placed in doubt by the ruling in the case, and
insisted that such clauses serve vital due process interests.” Id. (citing White,
536 U.S. at 812-14 (Breyer, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)).
82. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23.
83. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (providing that judicial
candidates “shall not themselves solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly
stated support”).
84. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
85. Id.
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from disclosing their party affiliation.86 The court found that the
clauses violated judges’ free speech and associational rights
because, among other things, they suppressed too much speech to
advance the government’s interest in an unbiased judiciary.87
Even the Eighth Circuit, when it considered White again on
remand, invalidated two additional clauses of Minnesota’s Code of
Judicial Conduct.88 The first prevented judicial candidates from
identifying themselves as members of a political organization and
accepting political endorsements.89 The second barred judicial
candidates from personally soliciting financial contributions.90 The
court found that both restrictions violated judges’ First
Amendment rights by burdening judges’ political speech and
associational rights.91 A number of federal district courts have
used White to strike down similar clauses found in their states’
judicial codes.92
However, all of these rulings read White more broadly than
required by its holding. They extend the scope of First Amendment
liberties farther than may be appropriate in the judicial election
context and fail to afford adequate weight to the states’ due
process interest in judicial impartiality.
D. Siefert v. Alexander: A Harmonization of Modern First
Amendment Jurisprudence
The Seventh Circuit’s examination of the Wisconsin Judicial
Code provisions at issue in Siefert v. Alexander marked an attempt
to return to a faithful interpretation of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment analysis of judicial speech restrictions in White.93 By

86. Carey, 614 F.3d at 203-04; KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300, Canon 5(A)(2),
5(B)(2); KY. JUDICIAL ETHICS OP. JE–105 (2004) (prohibiting judges and
candidates from disclosing their party affiliation “in any form of advertising,
or when speaking to a gathering,” except in answer to a question by a voter in
one-on-one or “very small private informal” settings and prohibiting judicial
candidates from “solicit[ing] campaign funds,” a restriction that extends to all
fundraising by the candidate, including in-person solicitations, group
solicitations, telephone calls and letters).
87. Carey, 613 F.3d at 203-04.
88. White, 416 F.3d at 738.
89. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(a) (2002).
90. Id. at (B)(2).
91. White, 416 F.3d at 788.
92. See Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1232-33 (limiting the application of
canons that forbid candidates from promising to rule in a particular manner or
to commit themselves in advance on legal issues); accord Alaska Right to Life
Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Alaska
2005) (invalidating a similar provision in Alaska code); N.D. Family Alliance,
361 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39 (striking down two provisions of the North Dakota
code). But see In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding pledges
and promises clause).
93. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 979 (finding that “White left open some of the
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restricting White to what it actually held, the Siefert court was
able to apply a more sophisticated First Amendment analysis to
the contested restrictions by considering other strains of First
Amendment jurisprudence.94 Such an analysis more accurately
represented states’ competing interest in due process.95
First, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the type of speech
restriction the Supreme Court considered in White forbade speech
on the basis of its content and burdened a category of speech that
is at the core of First Amendment freedoms:96 speech about the
qualifications of candidates for public office.97 The Siefert court
found that the first contested provision of the Wisconsin Judicial
Code was also a content-based restriction.98 By prohibiting all
judges and candidates for judicial office from affiliating with any
political party,99 the restriction prevented Judge Siefert from
speaking about both his political views and his qualifications for
office.100 Because this provision fell squarely within the ambit of
the Supreme Court’s analysis in White, it was properly subject to
strict First Amendment scrutiny.101
By contrast, the second contested provision of the Wisconsin
Judicial Code, which prohibited judges and judicial candidates
from publicly endorsing or speaking on behalf of any partisan
candidate or platform,102 served a purpose distinct from the speech
at issue in White.103 The Siefert court found that “endorsements
are not simply a mode of announcing a judge’s views on an issue,
or shorthand for that view.”104 Rather, the offering of an
endorsement is a judge’s effort to affect a separate political
campaign,105 and thereby trade on the prestige of the judicial office
questions we deal with today”); see also White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that states may regulate the behavior of their judges to
protect the integrity of their courts).
94. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 981 (stating that “[m]uch of our discussion involves
our attempt to harmonize two strains of First Amendment law”); see Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568 (balancing public employees’ right to speak out on matters of
public concern against the government’s interest in “promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees”).
95. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984 (asserting that “restrictions on judicial speech
may, in some circumstances, be required by the Due Process Clause”).
96. White, 536 U.S. at 774.
97. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 981.
98. Id.; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (defining a contentbased restriction as one that “focuses only on the content of the speech and the
direct impact that speech has on its listeners”).
99. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)1.
100. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 981.
101. Id.
102. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)4.
103. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 983.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 984; see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1
cmt. 4 (2007) (justifying the restriction on endorsements based on the danger
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to advance other political ends.106 Thus, there is a clear distinction
between a political endorsement and speech about a judge’s own
campaign.107
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized similar
distinctions and has accordingly drawn a careful line “between
partisan political activities and mere expressions of views.”108 Into
the latter category fall cases like White, which subject “viewpoint”
speech restrictions to strict scrutiny.109 Into the former category,
however, fall cases like Pickering, which grant governmental
entities more leeway to proscribe certain categories of speech in
order to promote the efficient performance of governmental
functions.110
Because public endorsements are often exchanged between
political actors on a quid pro quo basis,111 they may interfere with
the judicial branch’s ability to carry out the impartial
administration of justice.112 A more deferential approach to
governmental prohibition of endorsements is therefore justified.113
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit subjected the endorsement
of “abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the interests of others”).
106. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 983.
107. Id. at 983; see Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 555 (explaining that the
government is “empowered to prevent its employees from contributing energy
as well as from collecting money for partisan political ends”); see also United
Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) (stating that
“[e]xpressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of
public interest, not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long
as the Government employee does not direct his activities toward party
success”).
108. Biller, 863 F.2d at 1089; see also Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 100 (upholding
the constitutionality of the Hatch Act because it forbade only partisan political
activity, “active participation in political management and political
campaigns” is proscribed).
109. See White, 536 U.S. at 774 (concluding that the correct test to be
applied to analyze the constitutionality of content-based speech restrictions is
strict scrutiny); see Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (subjecting content-based speech
restriction to strict scrutiny, and stating that “[i]f a statute regulates speech
based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative”).
110. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (finding that “[t]he problem in any case
is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees”); see also Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 96 (finding that “[a]gain
this Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a
congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed
evil of political partisanship by classified employees of the government.”).
111. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984.
112. Id. at 985 (stating that the Court’s justification for the government
restriction in Pickering was related to the government’s duty to ensure that
public services are performed efficiently).
113. Id. at 984.
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provision of the Wisconsin Judicial Code to a test that balances the
state’s interest in ensuring that the judicial branch performs its
function both efficiently and in accordance with due process
requirements, against Judge Siefert’s interest in endorsing a
candidate for political office.114
Finally, the Siefert court considered the final portion of the
Wisconsin Judicial Code, which banned judges and judicial
candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.115
Recognizing that, like public endorsement restrictions, solicitation
bans were another issue that the Supreme Court did not reach in
White,116 the Seventh Circuit looked to other First Amendment
jurisprudence to determine the appropriate framework under
which such restrictions should be reviewed.117 In Buckley v. Valeo,
the Supreme Court reasoned that restrictions on raising campaign
funds were typically less burdensome to speech than restrictions
on spending campaign funds.118 Thus, while restrictions on
spending by candidates and parties are reviewed under strict
scrutiny, restrictions on contributions are reviewed under less
rigorous closely drawn scrutiny,119 which requires that the

114. Id. at 985-86 (“as in Pickering, we have to find the balance between the
state’s interest and the judge’s.”). The court explained the Pickering approach:
Under the Pickering approach, narrow tailoring is not the requirement;
the fit between state interest and regulation need not be so exact.
Instead, the state’s interest must be weighed against the employee’s
interest in speaking. The state’s interest in the endorsement regulation
is a weighty one. Due process requires both fairness and the appearance
of fairness in the tribunal.
Id.
115. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(4).
116. Id. at 988-90.
117. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 988; see Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of
Penn., 944 F.2d 137, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding Pennsylvania’s personal
solicitation ban under a standard more deferential to government than strict
scrutiny because the collection and expenditure of money for campaigns
“invites abuses that are inconsistent with the ideals of an impartial and
incorruptible judiciary.”).
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing a
compelling state interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption in elections through some campaign finance regulation and
therefore creating a two-tiered scheme of review for campaign finance
regulations); see also Siefert, 608 F.3d at 988 (stating that “at heart, [a]
solicitation ban is a campaign finance regulation.”).
119. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; Siefert, 608 F.3d at 988; see also McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136-38 (2003), overruled on other grounds
by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (applying
closely drawn scrutiny to a solicitation ban in the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act because it did not restrict the amount or manner in which
a judicial candidate could spend money on his or her campaign); Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 909 (noting and reinforcing the distinction between
independent expenditures on behalf of candidates and direct contributions to
candidates); but see White, 416 F.3d at 765-66 (applying strict scrutiny to a
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government use methods that are closely drawn to further a
sufficiently important interest.120 Because the Wisconsin Judicial
Code’s solicitation ban did not limit the amount or way that a
judicial candidate can spend money on his or her campaign, it was
appropriately subject to closely drawn scrutiny.121
IV. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari on Siefert v.
Alexander.122 Nevertheless, the Court regularly receives appeals
challenging the constitutionality of judicial codes of conduct.123
Given that the constitutionality of judicial endorsement and
solicitation bans have caused splits between the various circuit
courts in just the past year,124 the Supreme Court may well decide
to hear another case involving judicial codes of conduct in the near
future. A grant of certiorari will undoubtedly include both
endorsement and solicitation ban challenges.125
In order to preserve judicial impartiality, the Supreme Court
should adopt the test laid out by the Seventh Circuit in Siefert to
evaluate the constitutionality of endorsement and solicitation
bans. By using the Pickering balancing test on endorsement
restrictions and the Buckley test on solicitation restrictions, the

solicitation ban).
120. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
121. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 990 (concluding that “the solicitation ban is drawn
closely enough to the state’s interest in preserving impartiality and preventing
corruption to be constitutional” and finding that “[t]he fact that a judge might
become aware of who has or has not contributed to his campaign does not
fatally undercut the state’s interest in the ban - the personal solicitation itself
presents the greatest danger to impartiality and its appearance”).
122. Siefert v. Alexander, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
123. See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d
65 (2d Cir. 2003) (deciding a challenge to three New York judicial codes of
conduct), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80
(Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (rendering judgment on a challenge to a judicial canon
that prohibited judicial candidates from making statements that appeared to
commit the candidate to a particular side of a contested issue), cert. denied
sub. nom. Kinsey v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
124. Compare Carey, 614 F.3d at 207 (holding that the judicial solicitation
ban fails a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest), with Siefert, 608 F.3d at 990 (concluding
that judicial endorsement ban is constitutional under the Pickering balancing
test because the state’s interest in judicial impartiality outweighs the judge’s
interest in giving an endorsement and that the judicial solicitation ban is
constitutional under the Buckley framework because it is closely drawn to an
important government interest).
125. See Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 10, 5-6
(2010) (stating that one of the factors the Court considers in deciding whether
to grant certiorari is if “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision
in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter”).
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Court will enable states to avoid serious due process problems.126
A. The Pickering Balancing Test: The Way of the Future for
Judicial Endorsement Restrictions
In Pickering, the Supreme Court recognized that
governmental entities have some leeway to proscribe certain
categories of speech among their citizens in order to promote the
efficient performance of governmental functions.127 Thus, under
Pickering, narrow tailoring is not the requirement.128 Rather, the
state’s interest in prohibiting speech must be weighed against the
citizen’s interest in speaking.129
Bans on political endorsements found in judicial codes of
conduct should be subject to the more deferential balancing test
that the Supreme Court articulated in Pickering, rather than strict
scrutiny, for two reasons. First, a judge’s public endorsement of a
partisan political candidate poses a risk that judges will abuse the
prestige of their office in order to advance the interests of
others.130 This is because, unlike a judge’s affiliation with a
political party or discussion about legal issues,131 an endorsement
is not simply a means for the judge to express a viewpoint on a
particular issue. Rather, endorsements may be exchanged between
the judge and the endorsee on a quid pro quo basis,132 which
undermines impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the
judiciary.133 This difference between an endorsement and speech
about a judge’s own campaign justifies the Pickering test’s more
deferential approach to government prohibition of these
endorsements.134

126. See Aimee Priya Ghosh, Disrobing Judicial Campaign Contributions: A
Case for Using the Buckley Framework to Analyze the Constitutionality of
Judicial Solicitation Bans, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 125, 149-50 (2011) (arguing that
judicial solicitation bans resemble a class of speech restrictions that are
upheld in the interest of keeping the court system functioning in an efficient
and objective manner).
127. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899
(noting that while political speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, “a
narrow class of speech restrictions” are constitutionally permissible if “based
on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”).
128. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 549 (7th
Cir. 2009).
129. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985.
130. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 4 (2007).
131. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (citing Eu, 489 U.S. at 223); see also
White, 536 U.S. at 774 (noting that “speech about the qualifications of
candidates for public office” is “at the core of our First Amendment freedoms”).
132. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984.
133. Id. at 985. “[T]o perform its high function in the best way, ‘justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.’” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (1955) (quoting
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
134. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556; Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99; see also
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Second, the Pickering balancing test should be used to
evaluate the constitutionality of judicial endorsement restrictions
because elected judges are more akin to government employees
than they are to legislative actors.135 Although elected judges
receive job evaluations from the voting public in the form of reelections, they are employed in the essential day-to-day task of
operating a judicial system that must not only be fair and
impartial, but must also appear to the public to be fair and
impartial.136 After all, it is a “small comfort for a litigant who
takes her case to state court to know that while her trial was
unfair, the judge would eventually lose an election.”137 Therefore,
states must be able to implement safeguards to ensure that judges
are accountable, not just to the voters, but to their responsibilities
under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. As due process requires
both fairness and the appearance of fairness in the tribunal,138 the
Pickering test is more appropriate than strict scrutiny because it
allows states more leeway to prevent judges from undermining the
appearance of impartiality by speaking on behalf of partisan
political candidates.
Furthermore, the Pickering balancing test is the more
suitable test because the risk of bias that occurs when parties that
the judge has endorsed appear in the judge’s court is not mitigated
by the remedy of recusal.139 Both the volume of litigation involving
the government and the small number of judges in most circuit
courts make recusal impracticable in the case where a judge
endorses a prosecutor or sheriff.140 Partisan law enforcement
officials appear frequently before state courts, particularly
prosecutors and sheriffs, who are involved in litigation nearly
every day.141 Because the Pickering test merely balances the need
for the endorsement restriction against the judge’s interest in
speaking instead of subjecting the restriction to strict scrutiny, it
would allow the government to combat more due process violations
caused by endorsements when other less restrictive remedies, like
Biller, 863 F.2d at 1089 (noting that the Supreme Court has drawn a careful
line between “partisan political activities” and “mere expressions of views”).
135. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984-85; see also Jenevein, 493 F.3d at 558
(recognizing that the position of an elected judge resembles that of a
government employee).
136. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 985.
137. Id.; see also White, 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting
that “state rules fill the gap between elections in order to develop the fair
jurists to whom each litigant is entitled.”).
138. See Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14 (arguing that judges should not preside over
cases in which they are unable to be impartial).
139. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987.
140. See Phillips & Poll, supra note 40, at 707-08 (stating that in most
jurisdictions, existing recusal standards are too restrictive to be effective in
attaining an independent and impartial judicial branch).
141. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987.
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recusal, are not viable.
B. The Buckley Test: The Best Way to Restrict the Solicitation of
Campaign Contributions by Judges
If the Supreme Court decides to hear a challenge to a judicial
solicitation ban, it should establish the Buckley framework as the
appropriate method of analysis for the ban.142 Because the Buckley
framework articulates an anti-coercion rationale,143 subjecting
solicitation bans to Buckley’s closely drawn scrutiny instead of
strict scrutiny acts to preserve judicial impartiality.
In states that have enacted solicitation bans, judges and
judicial candidates are prohibited from directly asking lawyers,
businesses, lobbyists, or unions for money.144 This prevents people
from feeling directly or indirectly coerced by the presence of judges
to contribute funds to judicial campaigns.145 Furthermore, a
contribution given directly to a judge in response to a judge’s
personal solicitation of that contribution carries with it both a
greater potential for a quid pro quo and a greater appearance of a
quid pro quo than a contribution given to the judge’s campaign
committee at the request of someone other than the judge.146

142. See Ghosh, supra note 126, at 152 (positing that state solicitation bans
pass constitutional muster under the Buckley framework); see also Siefert, 608
F.3d at 988 (stating that Citizens United, rather than overruling Buckley,
noted and reinforced the distinction between independent expenditures on
behalf of candidates and direct contributions to candidates); see generally
Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 290-92 (2010) (explaining that in Buckley, the
Court upheld certain limitations on contributions, finding that “a limitation
upon the amount that can be contributed to a candidate ‘entails only a
marginal restriction’ upon the contributor’s expressive rights because a
contribution communicates only general support for a candidate and his views
and not ‘the underlying basis of that support’”).
143. White, 416 F.3d at 769 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (stating that “[o]penmindedness, in Justice Scalia’s terminology, is in reality simply a facet of the
anti-corruption interest that was recognized in [Buckley] and subsequent
campaign finance cases”).
144. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011)
(providing a model prohibition preventing judicial candidates from directly
soliciting contributions from any source); see also GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (providing that judicial candidates “shall not
themselves solicit campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support”); Thomas
K. Byerley, Focus on Professional Responsibility – The Ethics of Judicial
Campaigns, MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL, Vol. 79, No. 6 (July 2000) available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articleID=101&volumeID=9&
viewType=archive (explaining that under the Michigan Code of Judicial
conduct, a judicial campaign committee may not solicit contributions of more
than one hundred dollars from a lawyer).
145. Siefert, 608 F.3d at 989.
146. Id. at 989-90.
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Despite the due process danger of partiality posed by direct
solicitations, courts have declined to recognize a compelling state
interest in protecting potential contributors from feeling
coerced.147 As a result, these solicitation bans would always fail
strict scrutiny.
Yet, it is undeniable that the perceived coerciveness of direct
solicitations is closely related to their potential impact on
impartiality.148 As the Siefert court noted, “[a] direct solicitation
closely links the quid - avoiding the judge’s future disfavor - to the
quo - the contribution.”149 Additionally, because judicial campaigns
are often largely funded by lawyers,150 it would be unworkable for
judges to recuse themselves in every case that involved a lawyer
from whom they had previously solicited a contribution.151 Thus,
the Buckley framework is more appropriate than strict scrutiny
because it would allow states to preserve judicial impartiality by
enabling them to enact solicitation bans that would not be
immediately struck down under a more rigorous constitutional
analysis.

147. See, e.g., id. at 989 (refusing to recognize a compelling state interest in
preventing campaign contributors from feeling coerced).
148. See id. at n.6 (stating that “[l]egislators are not expected to be
impartial; indeed, they are elected to advance the policies advocated by
particular political parties, interest groups, or individuals. Judges, on the
other hand, must be impartial toward the parties and lawyers who appear
before them”). “In addition, legislators can only act with the support of their
colleagues. Judges—particularly trial court judges—exercise wide and largely
unreviewable discretion over discrete cases involving specific parties and
lawyers.” Id.
149. Id. at 989.
150. See Thomas K. Byerley, Focus on Professional Responsibility – The
Ethics of Judicial Campaigns, MICHIGAN BAR JOURNAL, Vol. 79, No. 6 (July
2000)
available
at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articleID=101&volumeID=9&view
Type=archive (discussing the amount of money that lawyers may contribute to
the campaign committee of a judicial candidate); see, e.g., Anna Gorman, Too
Many Cases, Too Few Judges, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2008, at B1, B7 (reporting
that the caseload at the Los Angeles Immigration Court has risen
substantially in recent years, but the number of judges has stayed the same,
causing delays); Finis Williams, With Too Few Judges, Civil Cases Languish,
CONCORD MONITOR (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.concordmonitor.com/
article/with-too-few-judges-civil-cases-languish (lamenting that there are not
enough judges in New Hampshire to deal with the civil case load at the county
court).
151. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Judge Recusals May Hinder Gulf Oil Spill
Lawsuits,
NPR
(June
8,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=127560878
&ft=1&f=127560878 (reporting that so many judges recused themselves due to
conflicts of interest that litigation has been seriously delayed).
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V. CONCLUSION
Restrictions on the endorsement of partisan political
candidates and the direct solicitation of campaign funds by judges
are entirely different from the restriction that the Supreme Court
struck down in White. They therefore merit the more flexible First
Amendment analysis that the Seventh Circuit articulated in
Siefert because such an analysis properly values the competing
concerns shared by both states and litigants for judicial
impartiality and due process.
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